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Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in 
Transportation: An Analysis of Alternatives
by Anthony M. Pagano
Public-Private	 Partnerships	 (PPP)	 are	 in	 the	 forefront	 of	 approaches	 to	 funding	 transportation	
infrastructure	 improvements.	 	Highlighted	 in	 the	highway	area	by	 long-term	 leases	of	 the	Chicago	
Skyway	and	Indiana	Toll	Road,	a	variety	of	states	are	investigating	the	use	of	public	private	partnerships	
either	 as	“Brownfield”	 leases	 like	 the	Chicago	and	 Indiana	 cases,	 or	“Greenfield”	Design,	Build,	
Operate,	Transfer	arrangements.	These	and	other	PPP	projects	raise	a	variety	of	issues,	including	the	
length	of	the	lease,	toll	escalation	permitted,	and		use	of	funds.	This	paper	develops	a	rationale	for	PPPs	
in	transportation,	evaluates	several	approaches	to	PPPs	using	this	rationale,	and	analyzes	some	of	the	
difficult	issues	that	can	surface.	
INTRODUCTION
The world of public private partnerships (PPP’s) changed in the United States in 2004 with the Chicago 
Skyway long-term lease agreement.  In exchange for an up front payment of $1.83 billion, the Skyway 
Concession Company comprised of Cintra and Macquarie Infrastructure Group will operate the facility 
for 99 years. This lease was followed in 2005 with the lease of the Indiana Toll Road.  The deal involved 
an up front payment of $3.8 billion to the State of Indiana for the right to operate the road for 75 
years, Ortiz and Buxbaum (2008). The City of Chicago has been pursuing a lease of Midway Airport. 
These types of deals are numerous in Europe and developing countries, but have not been used very 
much in the United States.  This paper develops a rationale for PPPs in transportation, evaluates several 
approaches to PPPs using this rationale, and analyzes some of the difficult issues that surface.
 
THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSPORTATION DECISIONS
In order to understand the rationale for public-private partnerships in transportation, it is necessary to 
begin with an understanding of the rationale for public involvement in transportation decisions. To 
begin, it is necessary to make a distinction between government involvement in transportation decisions 
and public provision of transportation facilities and services. Government involvement does not mean 
that government must actively develop and operate transportation facilities. A variety of reasons can be 
cited for government involvement in transportation decisions. These reasons center on market failure in 
transportation markets. This means if left to the private sector only, transportation services would not be 
produced in socially optimal amounts.  
One reason for government involvement concerns the nature of transportation markets. Either 
because of institutional reasons, the lumpiness of productive factors used to produce transportation, or 
because of decreasing costs with greater density along given routes, free entry into the production of 
transportation facilities and services may be precluded to the point that monopoly may result.  Without 
governmental involvement, market forces may fail to provide an optimal allocation of resources to 
transportation.  Exclusive private provision may result in only one or a few providers, producing a level 
and quality of transportation services that is less than desirable. 
A second reason concerns the externalities resulting from transportation, both positive and negative. 
These include land use impacts, economic development impacts, and air, noise, and water pollution, 
among others. If left solely to private providers, the social costs and benefits of transportation may not 
be fully taken into account. 
Public-Private Partnerships
78
To the extent that transportation services are public goods, then public involvement in transportation 
decisions can be justified as a third reason.  Public goods have two characteristics which result in lack 
of private supply in adequate amounts. The first characteristic is non-exclusion. Individuals can be 
excluded from the consumption of private goods provided by the free market if they do not pay for them. 
The characteristic of non-exclusion means that if private business would attempt to supply public goods, 
they could not obtain payment from all consum ers of the service. Although altruism may motivate some 
businesses, the lack of adequate revenues is a powerful deterrent to private provision of transportation 
services. 
The second characteristic of public goods is joint supply. This means that if the good or service 
is provided to one individual, it is jointly provided to everyone. The marginal cost of supplying one 
additional consumer is very low or zero. If price is set equal to marginal cost, private provision would 
not be forthcoming.
Other reasons for government involvement include the high risk and payback periods associated 
with large transportation projects, equity considerations (providing access to employment opportunities, 
shopping, and other opportunities), and the mobility options provided by access to alternative modes of 
transportation.
These reasons suggest that government should be involved in decisions concerning transportation 
facility and service levels.  The public sector may need to subsidize some services.  It should also 
participate in the planning and coordination of such services. 
RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION SERVICES
While a case for government involvement in transportation decisions can be made, it is less obvious 
why government should be involved in the actual production of transportation services.  
First, some functions require such elaborate supervision that even if they were produced by private 
firms, the situation would be the equivalent of public production.   In his classic book on public finance, 
Musgrave (1959) cites the operations of military establishments and the administration of justice as 
examples.  Services such as these require close control on the part of the electorate or representatives of 
the people in a democratic society.  However, transportation is not quite like the military, police, or the 
courts.  The necessity for close supervision does not seem to be a valid reason to justify public operation 
of transportation facilities.  
A second reason for public production of transportation services concerns the problems of natural 
monopoly. Public production is an alternative to regulated or unregulated private monopoly.  This 
justification rests on the premise that public production results in better outcomes than the other two 
alternatives.  It is a matter of judgment whether this premise is correct.  
Inertia may also explain why some services are produced in the public sector. Education and the 
postal monopoly are good examples.
As can be seen from this discussion, public production of services in general, and production of 
transportation services in particular, may not be justified in many situations.  
RATIONALE FOR PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
An important question to ask is why would private sector involvement be more desirable?  The answer 
centers on the two types of efficiency.  Allocative efficiency exists if resources are devoted to the highest 
value in use.  In the case of transportation, allocative efficiency exists if the amount and quality of 
transportation produced is at an optimal level.  Allocative efficiency thus concerns what and how much 
to produce.  The previous discussion of why government should be involved in transportation decisions 
involves allocative efficiency.
The second type of efficiency is called productive, managerial, cost or X-efficiency in Leibenstein’s 
(1966) terms.  Efficiency in this sense implies that production is maximized for a given level of inputs. 
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This type of efficiency is concerned not with how much to produce, but rather with how to produce it. 
A given level of transportation is provided efficiently in this sense if production costs are minimized.  
In the private sector, competitive forces and the desire to maximize profit and stay in business 
provide incentives for firms to achieve this second type of efficiency.  In a purely competitive situation, 
only those firms that have maximized cost efficiency can survive.
In the public sector, on the other hand, the incentives to achieve efficiency in the provision of 
public services are indirect. Incentives are provided through the political system by voters, legislators 
and appointed commissions. If efficiency in the provision of these services is not achieved, then this 
indirect process may take some time to make adjustments.   In many situations, ade quate adjustments 
may never be made.
This indirect process may involve voting a party or elected official out of office. However, many 
issues are usually involved in a decision as to which candidate to vote for. Waste and inefficiency 
in the provision of public services may be hidden under an array of other problems and issues. The 
process may also involve legislatures passing laws which attempt to provide incentives for the efficient 
administration of government programs. However, dedicated public administrators must implement 
these laws and deal with an entrenched bureaucracy protected by civil service status. This bureau cracy 
may remain largely unaffected by attempts to streamline public programs.
Special commissions perform studies and make recommendations to produce government services 
more efficiently. However, in many cases these reports seem to end up on a bookshelf rather than being 
implemented. The problem is that the direct incentives of profit, loss, and competition in the private 
sector are not present in the public sector.
RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
This discussion suggests that a combination of public-private sector involvement in transportation 
would result in a better achievement of both types of efficiencies. If sole reliance is placed on the private 
sector, market failure may result.  Allocative efficiency may not be attained.  If sole reliance is placed on 
government to provide transportation services, cost efficiency may not result.  
However, if the public sector maintains a role in transportation such as planning, coordination, and 
possibly subsidy, and the private sector is used to actually operate the system, then possibly both types 
of efficiency could be attained.  This is especially true if private sector partners can be obtained through 
competitive markets or a competitive bid process.  
This public-private partnership is what Osborne and Gaebler (1993) called Steering vs. Rowing. 
In their view, government and the private sector should specialize in what each sector does best. 
Government is best at steering – deciding what to produce, how much to produce, and allocating 
resources to production. The private sector is best in actually producing the service. Each sector 
specializes in its core business function.  
There are other rationales for public-private partnerships that include capital shortages of financially 
strapped jurisdictions, ability to access value in the facility, the ability to raise tolls independent of 
political considerations, and transfer of risk from the public sector to the private. For details on the 
kinds of risks that can be transferred see FHWA (2007).   The implementation of a PPP based on these 
rationales may also have an effect on both allocative and cost efficiency potential.
TYPES OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
There are a variety of public-private partnerships that have been practiced in transportation.  Some 
are designed to achieve the allocative and X-efficiency goals outlined above. Others, however, may 
have far different motivations. Table 1 shows a categorization of alternative public-private partnership 
approaches to the provision of transportation services.  This table shows broad categories of approaches. 
Within each category, there could be several alternative ways in which the public and private sectors 
interreact.  
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Table 1:  Alternative Public-Private Partnership Approaches in Transportation
Approach Private Sector Role     Public Sector Role
1.  Design Build Design and Construction 
of Facility
Planning, Operation and Subsidy 
of  Facility
2.  Build, Operate Transfer 
(BOT) or DBOT – Greenfield 
Concession
Build, Operate, Finance, 
Maintain, Transfer
Negotiation with private 
companies, regulation, contract 
enforcement, quality assurance
3.  Long Term Lease of Existing 
Facility – Brownfield 
Concession
Finance, Operate, 
Maintain, Transfer
Negotiation with private 
companies, regulation, contract 
enforcement, quality assurance
4.  Competitive Contracting Operation and 
Maintenance
Negotiation with private 
companies, regulation, contract 
enforcement, quality assurance, 
subsidy
5.  Asset Sales Finance, Operate, 
Maintain
Negotiation with private 
companies or no role
6.  Vouchers Finance, Operate, 
Maintain
Negotiation with private 
companies, subsidy, quality 
assurance
7.  Deregulation Build, Operate, Finance, 
Maintain
None
8.  Publicization Build, Operate, Finance, 
Maintain
Planning, Subsidy
The first approach is Design-Build.  The private sector designs and constructs the new facility. 
The public sector role is planning, operation, and subsidy of the facility.  This is the classic approach to 
public-private partnerships by which most of the highway system in the United States was constructed. 
The second approach is Build, Operate Transfer (BOT) or Design, Build, Operate Transfer (DBOT). 
In this approach, the private sector builds, operates, finances, and maintains the facility, and then over a 
period of years, transfers the facility to the public sector. This is called a “Greenfield Concession” since 
a brand new facility is built.  There are a variety of roles that the private sector can play in this type 
of PPP.  The private sector can finance the facility or financing can be done by the public sector. One 
important question is should these roles be performed by the same or different firms.  Marimort and 
Pouyet (2008) analyze whether building infrastructure and managing assets should be bundled or not. 
They conclude that a technology-driven reason is the basis for this decision.  
The public sector is involved in negotiation with private companies, possible regulation of prices, 
contract enforcement, and quality assurance. This approach has been widely used in developing 
countries where there is a capital scarcity.  The length of the concession can vary up to 99 years.  Most 
typical are concessions that last for 30–50 years. Details on various alternatives within this approach can 
be found in Buxbaum and Ortiz (2009).
A long term lease of an existing facility, called a “Brownfield Concession,” is the third approach. 
This is the approach that has gained much notoriety after the leases of the Chicago Skyway and the 
Indiana Toll Road. The possible lease of Midway Airport is also this type.  The Chicago Skyway lease 
was the first in the United States. This type of PPP has raised many questions, which will be discussed 
later in this paper. 
Competitive Contracting is the fourth approach.  In this approach, the public sector contracts with 
the private sector to operate and maintain a service.  The public sector is involved in negotiation with the 
private sector, regulation, contract enforcement, quality assurance, and subsidy of the service.  This type 
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of PPP is prevalent in public transit throughout the country, including service in Denver, Phoenix, Los 
Angeles suburbs, and Chicago suburbs. Much of the paratransit service in the United States is provided 
through this approach. For a discussion of a variety of contracted services in transit see Richmond 
(2001).
The fifth approach is Asset Sales. This approach is used to privatize State Owned Enterprises (SOE). 
The private sector takes the role of financing, operating, and maintaining the facility.  The public sector 
role is either to negotiate a sales price with private companies or no role. There are two types of asset 
sales.  One is a Citizen Share Purchase, in which the asset is sold to an individual company or shares 
are sold in the marketplace. In this approach, the government keeps all the proceeds from the sale. The 
privatization of Conrail was done in this manner.  The second approach is called “Voucher Privatization” 
by Pool (1996).  In this approach, the SOE is privatized by distributing shares to citizens of the country. 
Citizens are free to sell or keep their shares.  In this case, the proceeds from the sale accrue to individuals 
rather than to the government.  British Columbia used this approach in the privatization of its state-
owned forest products and natural gas companies. Pool (1996) notes that this approach was also used by 
the Czech Republic in privatizing its SOEs.  Asset sales are similar to “Brownfield Concessions,” except 
the facility is permanently transferred to the private sector.
The next PPP approach is Vouchers.  In this approach, vouchers are provided to users of the service 
to purchase the service from private operators.  Private companies are responsible for all aspects of their 
service, while the public sector negotiates with the private companies on the basis of price and quality 
of service. The public sector also subsidizes the service and monitors quality.  This approach has been 
used extensively in paratransit operations in the United States and in school vouchers in several cities.
In Deregulation, the public sector allows private competition with a formerly monopoly public 
sector operation. The private sector is responsible for all aspects of their service, while the public sector 
plays no role in the private sector operation. The U.S. postal service, which allows competition from 
FedEx and UPS for overnight and package delivery, is a good example of this approach.  While not 
necessarily a public-private partnership, the private sector competition can result in the public sector 
becoming more efficient and effective in the provision of its services.
The last PPP approach can be called “Publicization.” In this approach, the public sector becomes 
involved in what was an exclusive private operation.  Publicization is not nationalization, since there 
is a very large role played by the private sector.  Examples include the CREATE project in Chicago, 
where the public sector is working with the railroads to reduce time spent in the Chicago terminal, and 
the Wisconsin and Southern Railroad in Wisconsin, in which the state has acquired the trackage on 
which the private railroad operates.  Other examples include the Alemeda Corridor project in Southern 
California, the BNSF Flyover in Kansas, the FAST project in the state of Washington, and the Sauk 
Village Logisticenter development in suburban Chicago. In each of these cases, the public sector has 
become involved in what has traditionally been a strictly private sector endeavor to build, maintain, and 
operate freight transportation infrastructure. Also included in this category are various approaches to 
transit-oriented development and joint development agreements.  
Other PPP approaches are strictly financial, such as Business Improvement Districts (BID), which 
involves assessing businesses which are adjacent to a transportation development, and Tax Increment 
Financing (TIF), in which increased property tax revenues pay for current infrastructure investment 
(FHWA 2007).
EVALUATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
Given the variety of alternative public-private partnerships, the next question is how well do each of 
these achieve society’s transportation goals.  In order to answer this question, each approach is analyzed 
for its potential in achieving allocative and cost efficiency.  This potential may or may not be achieved 
in practice.  However, it is more likely that efficient operations would result if a high potential approach 
were implemented, rather than one with poor potential.  The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Evaluation of Public-Private Partnership Approaches in Transportation
Approach
Allocative Efficiency 
Potential
Cost Efficiency 
Potential
1. Design Build Excellent Poor
2. Build, Operate Transfer (BOT) or DBOT – 
    Greenfield Concession
Depends on Specifics of 
the Contract
Excellent
3. Long Term Lease of Existing Facility –  
    Brownfield Concession
Depends on Specifics of 
the Contract
Excellent
4. Competitive Contracting Excellent Excellent
5. Asset Sales
Good – Depends on 
Details 
Good 
6. Vouchers Excellent Excellent
7. Deregulation Excellent Good to Poor
8. Publicization Excellent Good
The potential for an approach to achieve allocative efficiency would be present if the alternative has 
a strong potential to achieve an optimal allocation of resources to transportation services. This includes 
the potential to take externalities into account in production decisions, the public goods nature of some 
facilities, and the avoidance of private monopoly.  In addition, allocative efficiency results if equity 
considerations can be dealt with and if the approach can provide a funding mechanism for large, risky 
projects with long payback periods.  Cost efficiency potential is present if the implementation of an 
approach results in the creation of incentives to be efficient.  
Each of the approaches is ranked as excellent, good, or poor in potential to achieve these efficiencies. 
For allocative efficiency, excellent implies that implementing an approach will most likely lead to 
effective use of resources in transportation.  The socially desirable amount and type of transportation 
has the best chance of being achieved under these alternatives.   Allocative efficiency is ranked as good 
if the alternative can lead to a social optimum in transportation, but this really depends on the details of 
the contract between the public and private sectors.  
A cost efficiency potential is ranked according to the extent to which incentives to be efficient are 
present in an alternative.  Excellent implies that market mechanisms are operating efficiently in that 
alternative.  Alternatives ranked as good imply that the market may have an effect on cost efficiency, but 
other factors such as monopoly provision may hinder cost efficiency goals.  Those ranked as poor imply 
that political rather than market mechanisms determine the efficiency of delivery of services.
The traditional approach, Design Build, involves the public sector actually planning, operating, and 
subsidizing the facility.  The private sector role is design and construction of the facility.  The allocative 
efficiency potential is excellent since the public sector can deal with externalities, public goods effects, 
and equity.  However, the cost efficiency potential is quite low.  The incentives to be efficient are indirect 
with this approach.
Greenfield Concessions have been used for many years in less developed countries.  They directly 
deal with the problem of capital scarcity by being able to access private capital markets.  The cost 
efficiency potential is excellent, since the incentives of the marketplace are at work in this approach. 
However, the allocative efficiency potential depends on the specifics of the contract with the private 
sector.  This is also the case for the Brownfield Concession approach.  However, both of these approaches 
raise many troubling issues which must be dealt with.  In the next section of this paper, several of these 
issues will be discussed.
Approach 4 is competitive contracting.  This approach has an excellent potential to achieve both 
types of efficiencies.  The public sector can take a large role in planning services, internalizing external 
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effects, and taking equity considerations and other allocative efficiency effects into account.  Relying 
on competitive bids, inefficient operators would be underbid by better managed firms.  As long as many 
operators are competing, the potential for cost efficiency is excellent. 
Asset sales have a good chance of achieving both allocative efficiency and cost efficiency goals. 
However, like Greenfield and Brownfield Concessions, the devil is in the details.  If the sale results 
in monopoly private operation of the facility, then cost efficiency goals may not be fully obtained. 
However, if the SOE is highly inefficient, with many layers of bureaucracy and unneeded workers and 
infused with corruption, then a private monopoly may be preferable.  Allocative efficiency potential 
depends on a variety of details, including the amount and type of government regulation.
Since Vouchers rely on the public sector to do the “Steering” and the private sector to do the 
“Rowing” the potential for achieving both allocative and cost efficiency goals are excellent.  
Deregulation, approach 7, can lead to excellent allocative efficiency potential since both the private 
sector and the public sector are providing the service.  However, since the public sector is providing 
a competing service, cost efficiency can suffer because of the lack of incentives for the public sector 
operation to be efficient, especially if the public operation is subsidized. 
Finally, Publicization has the potential to achieve allocative efficiencies since the public sector 
involvement can take a variety of external effects into account, including economic development and 
pollution.  Cost efficiency potential is good since the private sector is still very actively involved in the 
provision of service.
 
SOME DIFFICULT ISSUES
There are many difficult issues that must be dealt with in the implementation of PPPs. In this section 
of the paper, a few of these issues will be discussed.  This is not a comprehensive list.  The focus is on 
problems that affect Greenfield and Brownfield concessions.  
Length of the Contract Period
The first issue concerns the length of the contract period. This is especially the case for Brownfield 
Concessions.  The Chicago Skyway concession is for 99 years.  The Indiana Toll Road contract period 
is 75 years. The Midway Airport concession was proposed to last for 99 years.  Private companies prefer 
a longer payback period for two reasons.  One is that the company has a longer period in which to earn 
revenues to offset the initial investment. Second, for tax purposes, the IRS treats such a long term lease 
as ownership of the facility. The company can then depreciate investments as if they own the facility. 
So, private sector risk is reduced the longer the length of the contract. 
From a public sector standpoint, the longer the contract period, the more likely the facility will 
be able to generate higher up front payments. But there is a risk involved for longer contract periods. 
There are many societal, technological, and developmental changes that can occur in 99 years. 
Suppose a facility was leased in 1910, with a 99-year lease, coming due in 2009. The United States 
is fundamentally different in almost all aspects over those 99 years. A facility that was leased in 1910 
could stand in the way of new development today.  So could be the result in 2108, when a 99-year lease 
written today would be completed. The public sector may have new uses for the facility that may not 
be easily implemented if it is in private hands. This risk can be mitigated through the use of contract 
language that gives the public sector the right to purchase the lease at fair market value in the future. 
This, however, may lower the amount that firms would be willing to pay up front.  Additionally, in the 
long term, technology or development patterns may make the facility obsolete. This could affect the 
private sector risk in the later years of the lease as well.
The private firm that is leasing the facility would prefer a longer contract period to a shorter one. 
However, the present value of earnings far in the future will be less than near-term earnings. Thus, the 
private profitability curve flattens out over very long contract periods. The present value of the future 
income stream can be greater, the greater the amount of cost efficiency savings from private ownership. 
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To the extent that the public sector can bargain away some of these savings, the initial lease payment 
will be larger and the time that it takes to recoup the lease payment will be longer. 
To simplify the analysis, let us assume an initial lease payment with constant revenues and 
operations costs each year.  Then let:
L = the lease payment 
R = yearly revenues from the lease
C
f
 = yearly costs of operating the facility for the firm 
n = length of the contract period
r  = appropriate private sector discount factor
t = time
TP
n 
= Present value of profit stream to be derived from operating the lease over n years 
Then:
(1) 
The total profit that accrues to the private company leasing the facility is a transfer from road users to the 
company.  It can be considered the total social cost of the lease. This is not the social cost of operating 
the facility.  Rather, it is the social cost of leasing the facility to a private company.  This is shown in 
Figure 1 as TP
n
.  As shown in the figure, the present value of the total profits to be derived from leasing 
the facility increases at a decreasing rate, reflecting the declining present value of profits over time. 
Point B in the figure is the breakeven number of years of the lease. 
 
A reasonable approximation to the marginal profits accruing to the firm of leasing the facility for 
one more year is:
(2)
TPn =  ∑ 
n  
t = 1 
R - Cf
(1 + r)t
- L
$
L
Length of the Control Period
TPn
MPt
B
Figure 1: Present Value of Future Private Sector Profits from Lease
MPt =   R - Cf 
(1 + r)t 
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This is shown in the figure as MP
t
.  Marginal profits, and thus the marginal social cost of leasing the 
facility, decline over time. In making decisions as to the total upfront lease payment, and the length of 
the contract period, the private sector firm would use this function in the process of negotiation. 
The marginal social cost of a private firm operating the facility for one more year is equal to the 
marginal profits plus the yearly cost of operation.
So:
(3)
Society benefits from the operation of the facility.  Initially, the public sector receives the lease payment 
L from the private company.  This payment could include any cost efficiency gains that are bargained 
away from the private contractor.  In addition, there is the continuation of an allocative efficiency gain 
from continual use of the facility. However, this allocative efficiency gain declines over time.   The 
allocative efficiency gains are discounted by the appropriate social rate of discount and by a risk factor 
as alternative uses for the facility develop. Thus, the total pubic sector benefit curve declines over 
time as the length of the contract is extended.  To simplify, assume the allocative efficiency gains are a 
constant amount over time, and that the social discount factor is the same as the private sector discount 
factor.  Then:
(4) 
where:
SB
n
 = Total Social Benefits from leasing the facility
AE  =  Allocative Efficiency gains from the use of the facility
U =  Public sector risk factor
Then the marginal social benefits of leasing the facility are given by:
(5) 
Marginal social benefits and costs are shown in Figure 2. Initially, allocative efficiency benefits 
from the use of the facility are greater than the private sector costs of operation of the facility.  Otherwise, 
the facility would be abandoned.  Both benefits and costs of operation decline the longer the facility 
is operated.  This is shown as the declining curves in the figure.  However, as displayed in the figure, 
MSB
t  
declines at a faster rate than MSC
 t  
, reflecting the public sector risk factor.  If the public sector risk 
factor is very low, the two functions may not intersect for many if not hundreds of years.  In that case, 
the facility is best sold to the private sector as an asset sale. 
The optimal length of the contract is shown as the intersection of these two lines, LC. If the length 
of the contract is less than this, it would be advantageous to expand the contract length.  Contract periods 
greater than LC would involve a social loss. Depending on the public sector risk factor, contract periods 
of 75 – 99 years may not be socially desirable. For example, PIROG has argued that contracts should be 
no longer than 30 years (Baxandall 2007). While this may be too short for some concessions to break 
even, it indicates that the longer contract periods may not be beneficial. Ortiz and Buxbaum (2008) note 
that in other countries, concession agreements are typically for 30–40 years. 
MSCt  =   _   R___ 
       (1 + r)t 
SBn  =  ∑ 
n 
t = 1 
     AE___    
(1 +r+U)t
+ L 
MSBt  =  
AE___ 
(1 +r+U)t 
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The Chicago Skyway concession agreement allows for toll increases after the first five years.  The 
increases can be at the highest of 2% per annum, increase in the CPI or increase in nominal GDP 
(Enright 2006).  Each of these possible toll increases results in a different revenue stream for the private 
contractor and thus a different marginal social cost function.   This is shown in Figure 3.  In the figure, 
it is assumed that nominal GDP growth is greater than the CPI, which is greater than 2%.  The greater 
the toll increases allowed, the greater the total revenues generated and the shorter the optimal contract 
period.  If traffic grows at faster rates, thus generating more revenues, then the optimal length of the 
contract would be less.  However, increases in traffic may also result in increased operating costs, thus 
changing the cost function.
This analysis assumes that public sector decision makers attempt to maximize social welfare.  This 
may not always be the case.  Maskin and Tirole (2008) consider situations when government officials 
have preferences that differ from those of a social welfare maximizer, such as preference for pork barrel 
projects. They develop a model to analyze the implications of these situations and suggest ways in 
which the negative effects on social welfare can be minimized.
Use of Funds from Initial Lease Payment
If a Greenfield Concession is implemented, the initial costs of the project are utilized to design and build 
the planned facility. Brownfield Concessions are different. A large upfront lease payment is made to 
the government entity by the private company. The government entity could use the proceeds for other 
transportation improvements or to pay for general government. There is a tendency to view this large 
payment as a windfall to be used to balance budgets, pay down debt, or fund new government services. 
In the case of the Chicago Skyway, proceeds were used to repay project debt, create reserve 
accounts, and provide for programs unrelated to transportation. The Indiana Toll Road proceeds were 
completely dedicated to funding a 10-year transportation capital program (FHWA 2009).
The lease payment must be paid back to the private company over time by users of the facility.  If it 
is used to finance transportation improvements, then users of the facility help to finance improvements 
elsewhere in the system. On the other hand, if the proceeds are used for general government, then users 
of the facility in the future will pay for general government today.  This is an intergenerational transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
$ 
           Length of the Contract Period LC 
MSCt
MSBt
Figure 2: Socially Optimal Contract Period
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that may not be socially desirable, especially since users of the facility years hence have no say in the 
matter.  
Non-Compete Provisions
Several of the contracts have non-compete provisions, giving the private sector contractor a monopoly 
over the provision of the service.  The inclusion of these provisions is a two-edged sword.  On the one 
hand, some of the market power that is transferred to private hands can be bargained away and may result 
in larger upfront payments, especially for Brownfield Concessions.  On the other hand, such market 
power can lead to much higher tolls over time. Thus, it may be necessary to counter such provisions 
with strict price regulation, which carries a whole host of problems which are well documented in the 
public utility literature.  
In the case of the Chicago Skyway, alternative routes currently exist, but are very circuitous.  The 
existence of these routes would tend to keep a cap on toll increases. There are several alternatives to 
Midway Airport, including O’Hare, Mitchell Airport in Milwaukee, and Gary Airport, which currently 
has no commercial service, but could host such service in the future. The Peotone Airport, which has 
been a source of contention for many years, could also serve as an alternative. Thus, there exists much 
potential competition for a Midway Airport concession outside the city of Chicago.  There are slower, 
but more scenic alternatives to the Indiana Toll Road, so competition already exists. Thus, in these three 
cases, non-compete provisions would have little or no practical effect.
Facilities Requiring Subsidy
Public transit offers unique problems with regard to PPPs. These facilities usually require subsidy, so it 
would not seem feasible to ask private operators to engage in a long-term concession and pay an upfront 
fee.  After all, who would pay to operate a money-losing facility?  The usual approaches in public transit 
are competitive contracting or vouchers, in which the private operator receives compensation from the 
public transit provider to operate routes or facilities.  
Figure 3: Toll Increases and Optimal Length of the Contract Period
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One approach that has been used in the United Kingdom is an “Availability Payment.” The private 
company is responsible for one or more functions of design, build, finance, operate and maintain a 
“Greenfield” project.   In return, the public agency provides a monthly payment to the company during 
the operations and maintenance phase of the project. In the United States, this approach has been used 
in the Port of Miami truck tunnel project. The FTA has selected three cities (Denver, Houston, and Bay 
Area) to implement such PPP projects (Fishman 2009).  
There are possibilities for other forms of PPPs in public transit as well. One alternative is for the 
private company to pay an upfront fee to the public transit provider to operate an existing route or 
facility for a certain number of years. The private operator could either control the fares charged with 
government vouchers for low income riders, receive an agreed upon shadow fare for each customer 
served, or receive an availability payment. A shadow fare is a payment to the private operator usually on 
a per rider basis as compensation for providing the service.  Typically, it would exceed the actual fare 
collected.  Shadow fares provide an incentive to increase ridership.
Such approaches have not been tried in the United States, but may offer many of the benefits of 
PPPs to transit.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Public-private partnerships offer the prospect of achieving desired social benefits of transportation in the 
most efficient manner possible. The planning, coordination and possibly subsidy provided by the public 
sector is combined with the incentives of the free market. There are a variety of approaches to PPPs 
that have been implemented either in the United States or in other countries. Most offer outstanding 
prospects of achieving both allocative and cost efficiency goals. The most problematic approach is the 
“Brownfield Concession,” which is most well known today. However, with carefully crafted agreements, 
shorter contract periods, and upfront payments that are used to enhance transportation, such an approach 
can also achieve social goals at lowest cost.   
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